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                                       ABSTRACT 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Sitting head of state immunity for crimes under international law has been a very 
controversial issue in recent times. On the one hand, the debate bears that personal immunity 
has been renounced for crimes under international law. On the other hand, the advocates of 
personal immunity claim that the principle of immunity is still persisting under customary 
International law. Although the International Criminal Court (ICC) is a treaty based court, it is 
able to extend its jurisdiction to non-state parties to the Rome Statute through a referral by 
the United Nations Security Council. Lacking its own enforcement body the ICC relies on the 
cooperation of other states for arrest and surrender of those it indicts. The extension of the 
court’s jurisdiction to non-state parties, such as the case of Sudanese President Omar Al 
Bashir, has led to the reluctance of state parties to the Rome Statue to effect arrest and 
surrender citing a ‘dilemma between two conflicting obligations’.  
This paper analyses the legal status of personal immunity before different fora such as 
International tribunals, foreign domestic courts and under customary international law. It also 
critically examines the legal basis for the alleged conflicting obligations of state parties. The 
paper at the end concludes that there is no conflicting obligation for states parties to fully co-
operate with the ICC and the lack of co-operation in the arrest and surrender of a sitting head 
of state is inconsistent with international law particularly with United Nation Charter and the 
Rome Statute. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION  
   1.1 Background of the Problem 
Under international law, for a state to apply its criminal jurisdiction the alleged crime should 
be committed in the state’s territory (territoriality principle) or the perpetrator’s or victim’s 
nationality should belong to the state in question (active and passive personality principles).1 
However, international crimes are not solely of concern to one state rather it is against the 
interest of the international community as a whole. Thus, it should be fitting that the 
international community is empowered to prosecute international crimes regardless of 
where the crimes occurred and against whom the crimes are committed.  
According to the development of the principle of universal jurisdiction, states have an 
authority to prosecute even in the absence of a special link to the crime. Consequently for 
crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, the principle of universal 
jurisdiction has been recognized under customary international law.2 The case of Pinochet3 
and Eichmann4 are both cases where domestic courts have exercised their jurisdiction in 
prosecuting international crimes. 
                                                          
1  Bassiouni MC (ed) International Criminal Law: Multilateral and Bilateral Enforcement Mechanisms 3ed 
(2008) 157. 
2  Orentlicher DF ‘Setting Accounts: the Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of Prior Regime’ (1991) 
Yale Law Journal 2582-94. See also Scharf M ‘The Letter of the Law: the Scope of International Legal 
Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes’ (1996) 59 The Law of Contemporary Problem 59. 
3  Pinochet was a Chile former president, when he travelled to UK for medical checks ups The Spanish 
government issued an arrest warrant for human rights violation he committed while he was in office. The 
case was brought before House of Lords and Court of Appeal in Britain. See Regina v Bow Street 
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, House of Lords (2000) No.3 AC 
147. 
4   Adolf Eichmann was a Nazi official, who was involved in the slaughtering of the Jews. He was seized in 
Argentina by Israeli security agents and brought before the District court of Jerusalem and Supreme Court 
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However, tension between state sovereignty and the protection of human rights has sparked 
a long standing debate on whether state officials should be held responsible for crimes under 
international law.5 However, one of the major possible hindrances of the prosecution of 
international crimes is the protection the person is granted as a result of immunity.6 Immunity 
is enjoyed by state officials from any judicial proceeding in foreign courts.7  However, the idea 
of individuals being held criminally responsible for crimes under international law regardless 
of their criminality under domestic law has been recognized.8 This crucial turn in international 
law is echoed in the eminent Nuremberg judgment.9  
Within the past decades, several former leaders have been prosecuted and convicted by 
international courts/hybrid courts for crimes under international law. The Rome Statute has 
clearly provided under Article 27 that immunity cannot be a bar to prosecution and 
contracting parties to the statute accept the provision which limits immunity while signing 
and ratifying it. Nonetheless, the United Nation Security Council (hereinafter UNSC) referral 
can subject a non-state party to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. This 
                                                          
of Appeal. See Attorney General of Israel v Eichmann, District court of Jerusalem (1961). See also, Attorney 
General of Israel v Adolf Eichmann (1962) Supreme Court of Israel International Law Report Vol 36 (1968).  
 5  Akande D ‘International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court’ 98 The American Journal of 
International Law (2004) 1. 
6   Cassese A et al Cassese’s International Criminal Law (2013) 318. See also Zappalà S ‘Do Heads of State in 
Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for International Crimes? The Ghaddafi case before French cour de 
cassation’ (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 598. 
7  Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) v. Belgium (Arrest Warrant case) International Court of Justice (2002) 
Para 51. See also Werle G and Jessberger F Principles of International Criminal Law 3ed (2014) 276, 
Cassese A et al (2013) 318. 
8   Foakes J ‘Immunity for International Crimes: Development in the Law on Prosecuting Heads of State in 
Foreign Courts’ (2011)  available at https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/17986 
(accessed on April 09, 2016).  
9   ‘[C]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by the abstract entities, and only by 
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can be the provisions of international be enforced.’ See 
International Military Tribunal, judgment, in the Trial of German Major war Criminals, proceeding at 
Nuremberg, Germany, Pt 22 (1950) Para 447. 
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happened in the cases of Libya’s former leader Muammar Gaddafi10 and Sudan’s president 
Omar Al-Bashir11 when the ICC issued arrest warrants following the UNSC’s referrals. While 
Gaddafi was overthrown from power by the Western backed revolution and later killed,12  Al-
Bashir is still a sitting president of Sudan and the country is not a state party to the Rome 
Statute.   
However, before a foreign domestic court, according to customary international law, a sitting 
president has absolute immunity from criminal jurisdiction.13 In addition, in June 2014 the 
African Union adopted an Amendment to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights (hereafter Malabo Protocol) to expand the jurisdiction of the 
African Court by adding criminal jurisdiction for crimes under international law,14 which has 
faced a lot of criticism for being a buffer for African leaders and for deflating the ICC 
jurisdiction as result of the inclusion of the Article 46bis immunity provision. 
The ICC does not have its own police force and only with state co-operation can individuals 
like Al-Bashir fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. Article 89 of Rome Statute has laid down 
an obligation on states parties to cooperate with the Court in terms of surrendering suspects 
to the Court. At the same time, the exception to this obligation is provided that the Court may 
                                                          
10   Pre-Trial Chamber I Warrant of Arrest for Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, the Situation in Libya 
No. ICC-01/11-13 2/7(2011). 
11   Pre-Trial Chamber I Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir the Situation in Darfur, Sudan ICC-02/05-01/09 1/146 (2009)  Para 36.  
12     Daqum L ‘Has Non-Immunity for Head of State Become a Rule of Customary International Law?’ in Bergsmo 
M  and Yan L (eds) State Sovereignty and International Criminal Law  (2012) 65. 
13   Arrest Warrant Case (2002). 
14  Tidai D ‘The Immunity Provision in the AU Amendment Protocol Separating the (Doctrinal) Wheat from the 
(Normative) Chaff’ (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 3-4. 
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not proceed with the request when the request is inconsistent with a state’s diplomatic 
immunity obligations.15  
States claim a competing obligation occurs between the serving head of state’s immunity 
under customary international law and the obligation to cooperate with ICC under the Rome 
Statute. Consequently, states have been unable to execute the arrest warrant for Bashir, the 
current head of state of Sudan and cooperate with the ICC. Even states like South Africa had 
warned Bashir not to attend national events like President Jacob Zuma's inauguration and the 
2010 World Cup in order to avoid the so called ‘dilemma of the two obligations’.16 
Furthermore, South Africa as a state party to the Rome Statute, had failed to arrest Al-Bashir 
while he was in South Africa for the African Union Summit.17 Nevertheless, the failure to 
cooperate with the ICC is not only attributed to South Africa, but also to other fellow ICC 
Statute members Kenya18, Malawi,19 Djibouti20 and Chad,21 who failed to arrest Bashir when 
he visited their countries.22 
                                                          
15  Article 98 of the Rome Statute.  
16  Al-Bashir Watch available at http://bashirwatch.org/  (accessed on April 15, 2016). 
17  South African Litigation Centre (SALC) v Government of South Africa, South African High Court Gauteng 
Division Pretoria (2015) judgment Para 34 seq. 
18  Al- Bashir visited Kenya on 27 August 2010 for the adoption of the new constitution however on November 
20, 2011 Kenya court has ordered the government to arrest Al-Bashir if he travelled again: available at 
http://bashirwatch.org/ (accessed on April 15, 2016). 
19  Al Bashir had also visited Malawi on 14 October 2011 for the Regional trade Summit available at 
http://bashirwatch.org/ (accessed on April 15, 2016). 
20  Al- Bashir travelled to Djibouti on 9 May 2011 to attend the inauguration of President Ismael Omar Guelleh 
available at http://bashirwatch.org/  (accessed on April 15, 2016). 
21  Al-Bashir has visited Chad multiple times for regional conference, Green African summit, swearing 
ceremony available at http://bashirwatch.org/ (accessed on April 15, 2016). 
22   Dougall C The Crime of Aggression under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2013) 305. 
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  1.2 Objective of the Study 
The objective of the study is to clarify the current status of immunities of sitting heads of 
states for crimes under international law.  On one hand, the immunity before International 
Courts for international crimes has been precluded by the different international tribunals, 
on the other hand  domestic courts of foreign states and the International Court of Justice 
have ascertained the absolute immunity of sitting of the head of state under customary 
international law. The Rome Statute, only applies to a state party before proceeding before 
the ICC and does not dictate the obligation of states under customary international law which 
likely governs the relationship between state parties to the ICC and non-member states. At 
the same time, the Malabo Protocol which intends to extend the jurisdiction of the African 
Court of Justice and Human Right has clearly protected the sitting head of state with utter 
immunity before the criminal chambers to be established within the court.  
Therefore, this research paper examines whether the Rome Statute’s exclusion of immunity 
for serving head of state and the principles of customary international law to accord immunity 
for sitting head of states invite ‘contradictory obligations’ to the state. Should the duty of 
states under the ICC be allowed to trump the obligation of a state party to respect immunity 
of a serving head of state under customary international law? Whether this obligation, obliges 
the state to comply with their treaty obligation and cooperate with ICC, will be further 
analyzed. Furthermore, if there are recent customary international law exception developed 
for immunity of head of state will also be examined. 
In addition, it  also explore whether Article 98 of the Rome Statute, which provides exceptions 
to the state duty to cooperate with the ICC, be revoked by a state for lack of co-operation 
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with the ICC in arresting and surrendering individuals. Furthermore, the inconsistency of 
Article 46bis of the Malabo Protocol is also discussed. .    
  1.3 Significance of the Study 
The issue of serving head of state immunity is still controversial even if the Rome Statute 
clearly avoided immunity for crimes under international law. Nevertheless, the right to 
immunity enjoyed by a sitting head of state accused of international crimes under customary 
international is not cut and dry. The status of this immunity before international tribunals and 
before domestic court is still confused. The Malabo Protocol’s inclusion of the Article 46bis 
immunity provision and Al-Bashir’s case before a South African court has brought the issue to 
the table again. Thus, the study  sheds light on this matter by going through the recent 
developments regarding the status of the sitting head of state immunity for crimes under 
international law which will be used as opinio juris and to give direction and clarity on this 
divisive issue of serving head of state immunity.  
  1.4 Research Methodology  
The research methodology employed are a qualitative desktop review of primary and 
secondary sources. The primary sources include, but are not limited, to laws, international 
treaties, case laws, and reports. The secondary sources such as books, journal articles, and 
internet sources are also reviewed. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
UNDERSTANDING STATE IMMUNITY AND IMMUNITY FOR THEIR OFFICIALS  
 
   2.1 Historical Background of State Immunity 
The origin of the rule on state immunity from foreign jurisdiction can be traced back to the 
early nineteenth century.23 The first case was  France v US in The Schooner Exchange V.M 
Faddon before a US District Court. When a ship belonging to the US was taken by orders of 
Napoleon, Emperor of  France on 30 December 1810.24 The ship under a different name, made 
a stop  in port of Philadelphia  a year after the seizure, the original owners brought a claim 
against France before US court, nevertheless the claim was dismissed on the ground of state 
immunity.25   
State immunity is a creation of customary international law and emanates from the notion of 
independence and equality of states. It denotes the notion that states are free from 
administrative, legislative and judicial jurisdiction of other states.26 Certainly, many states 
have acknowledged the notion of absolute immunity at one point or another, for instance the 
French Cour de Cassation has rejected France’s claim against a Spanish Company concerning 
the purchase of boots on the ground of absolute immunity of Spain.27 The notion of absolute 
immunity made no distinction between state officials’; civil, commercial and criminal actions; 
all official deeds enjoyed immunity. Nevertheless, the increasing involvement of states in 
commercial activities, officials taking advantage of their status and the fact that individuals 
                                                          
23  Alebeek RV The Immunity of States and Their Official in International Criminal Law and International 
Human Rights Law (2008) 12. 
24     The Schooner Exchange v M.Faddon US Supreme  Court (1812) 116. 
25   The Schooner Exchange v M.Faddon (1812) 116. 
26   Zhou L ‘Brief Analysis of Few Controversial Issues in Contemporary International Criminal Law in Bergsmo 
M and Yan L State Sovereignty and International criminal Law (2012)  46.  
27   Alebbek RV (2008) 13. 
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affected by the misdeeds of states were being left without remedy, led to the distinction 
between sovereign acts and non-sovereign acts.28 
Subsequently, the need to limit the absolute immunity of states and adopt a more restrictive 
approach was gaining ground and being observed by states, such as Italy and Belgium.29 The 
approach to shield states with absolute immunity from judicial proceedings was felt to entail 
a denial of justice.30 Thus, courts and critics accentuated that individuals dealing with states 
should be allowed to bring their claims before the courts in the interest of justice.31 In 
addition, the restrictive approach also plays in favor of the states. In the case of Guttieres v 
Elimlik, the Cassation Court of Florence stipulates that sticking to the absolute immunity 
approach will lead to individuals not feeling secure to get in business with states as a result 
of fear that their claim may not be entertained by the courts of other states, however the 
restrictive approach facilitates economic transactions for states as trading partners.32 
The 1972 European Convention on  State Immunity was the first convention which reflects 
the broad principle of customary international law. The Convention has illustrated areas in 
which states may not claim immunity pertaining to civil cases such as employment contracts, 
commercial transactions, property rights, such as use, ownership and possession, and torts 
arising in the forum state while criminal matters were left untouched.33 The issue of immunity 
is not only about limitations on the jurisdiction of foreign courts over a state, but it also 
includes immunity from executing judgments with enforcement measures, which were 
                                                          
28   Zhou L (2012) 47. 
29   Alebbek RV (2008) 13. 
30   Feldman CF ‘The United states Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act In Perspectives A Founders View’(1986) 
35 International and Comparative Law Quarterly  302. 
31   Alebbek RV (2008) 47. 
32   Guttieres v Elmilik 11F It.1886-I-913 (Italy Corte di Cassazione  di Firentze 1886) 921. 
33   Voetelink J Status of Forces: Criminal Jurisdiction over Military Personnel Abroad (2015) 129.  
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undertaken by foreign states. Nevertheless, a state is also entitled to waive the immunity and 
subject itself to the jurisdiction of a foreign court. In principle, the waiver of the immunity 
needs to be express, but implied waiver is also acceptable if supported by circumstances.34 
   2.2 Rational Behind the Notion of Immunity   
States and their officials are granted immunity from criminal and civil jurisdiction in the 
foreign states. This is justified from the fact that a state is sovereign, accordingly, one state 
cannot be expected to submit to the judgment of another court. 35 The rationale behind the 
rule of state immunity is explained below.  
 
 2.2.1 States are Equal   “Par in Parem Non Habet Imperium” 
Immunity is an old international principle and is rooted in the monarchies of pre-French 
Revolution.36 Sovereign was the epitome of the state, which is perceived as one and same.37 
Modern international law is founded upon the principle of state equality. 38  
According to Article 2 of the UN Charter, the organisation of the UN is based on the principle 
of sovereignty equality of all its member states.39 In addition, the UN General Assembly 
Resolution on Principle of International Law Concerning Friendly Relation and Co-operation 
among States further asserts that all states enjoy sovereign equality.40 Thus, the concept of 
                                                          
34  Shaw NM International Law (2014) 7ed 540. 
35   Douglas Z ‘State Immunity for the Acts of State Officials’ (2012) 82 The British Yearbook International Law 
301. 
36   Lauterpach H International Law: Volume 1 The General Works: Being Collected papers (1970) 26.  
37   Lauterpach H (1970) 26.  
38   Franey HE Immunity, Individuals and International Law, PhD Thesis (2009) 55. 
39   Article 2 of UN charter Para 2. 
40   General Assembly  Resoultion 2625(XXV) 1970.  
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sovereign equality provides that one state shall not interfere in the internal matters of 
another state.  
2.2.2 The Proficient Performance of State Officials Functions 
Senior state officials be it diplomats, foreign affairs, heads of state or heads of government, 
represent their state interest in another state, and if they are arrested, detained and brought 
before a court of law of another state, it clearly embarrasses the represented state and 
compromises state dignity. Furthermore, the friendly relations between the states will be 
jeopardized and international peace and security will also be menaced.41  Over and above 
that, it opens room for states to (arbitrarily) interfere in the affairs of another state and 
prevent officials from carrying out their official functions freely.  
Accordingly, immunity is crucial for state officials to undertake their functions in a foreign 
state with a different legal framework.42 The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations asserts 
that the purpose of privilege and immunities is not to the advantage of the officials, but rather 
to ensure efficient performance of the tasks of the diplomats in the respective state.43 
The Convention on Special Missions provides that the members of a special mission shall be 
inviolable to any form of arrest or detention.44 Article 31(1) enumerates members of special 
missions who enjoy immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the hosting state.45  
                                                          
41   Fox H and Webb P The Law State Immunity (2013) 31. 
42   Pedretti R Immunity of Head of State and State Official for International Crimes (2012) 107. 
43    Vienna Convention Consular Relation (1963) preamble. 
44   Article 29 of Special Mission Convention (1969).  
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Since the purpose of the immunity is to ensure efficient function of state officials, a state can 
waive the immunity if the state wishes to do so.46 
2.2.3 Promotion of International Relations  
Immunity is a tool used by states to facilitate smooth relations and preclude disputes between 
states. State officials represent their respective states, and said representation will be placed 
in jeopardy if these officials feel unsafe in a foreign state while traveling and/or carrying out 
their functions.47 Accordingly, their domestic matters should not be securitized by another 
state, and their policy and public administration should not be subjected to interference from 
a foreign court.  
2.3 Who is entitled to immunity?  
A) Consular Immunity 
Consular officers represent their nation in a foreign state; they involve in administrative 
functions and assist nationals living in that state.48 The Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations states that consuls are immune from arrest, detention, criminal and civil 
proceedings with regard to acts they performed in the exercise of their official functions.49 In 
other words, consular officers could be tried for the private acts that s/he has undertaken, 
however, the proceedings should not affect the official function of the consular.50 As 
                                                          
46   Article 32 of Vienna Convention Diplomatic Relation (1961), Article 45 of Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations ( 1963), Article 41 New York Special Mission Convention (1969). See also, Podgor ES and Clark RS 
Understanding International Criminal Law (2008) 2ed 125. 
47   Douglas Z (2012) 282. 
 48  Article 5 of Vienna convention on consular relation (1961). See also  Podgor ES and Clark RS (2008) 107. 
49   Article 41 of The Vienna Convention on consular Relation (1961). 
50   Shaw NM International Law  6 ed (2008) 774. 
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mentioned above, immunity enjoyed by consular officers can be waived by a sending state or 
by the individual, provided that the waiver of the immunity is express. 
B) Diplomatic  Immunity  
Diplomatic immunity is the most conventional and uncontended principle of international 
law.51  A diplomatic agent is entitled to inviolable immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the 
receiving state as well as civil and administrative jurisdiction except claims pertaining to 
property rights situated in a receiving state, succession matters where one is involved as a 
private person and unofficial or commercial acts.52 The Vienna Convention emphasized the 
necessity of diplomatic relations in the proficient conduct of international relations, and 
consequently, it has codified existing law and established others.53   
States are not obliged to engage in diplomatic relations without mutual consent,54 however, 
once the state gives its consent on the proposed mission, it has an obligation to respect 
immunity and the privilege of the diplomatic agents. Thus, the immunity is there to benefit 
the state; however, it may also be waived by the state. 55  
C) Persons Associated with International organisations  
Diplomatic immunity is also extended to representatives of international organisations 
located in the state territory.56 Thus, officials employed by  international organisations are 
entitled to immunity; however, the immunity they enjoy may differ. While permanent 
members and senior officials like United Nation Secretary Generals have absolute immunity; 
                                                          
51   Shaw NM (2008) 751. 
52   Article 32 of Vienna Convention (1961). 
53   Shaw NM (2008) 752. 
54  Article 2 of Vienna Convention (1961). 
55   Article 32(1) of Vienna Convention of Diplomatic Relation (1961) 
56   Article 4 (11), of Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (1946). 
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others only enjoy protection related to their official duty.57 This protection is embedded in 
the 1947 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies and also in the 
General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. 
D) Senior Officials Immunity     
Customary international law recognizes immunity for high-ranking state officials which 
include heads of state, heads of government and foreign affairs ministers.58 This immunity 
protects officials from proceedings before foreign domestic courts. The immunity is granted 
to ensure the effective performance of state acts by the official in the interest of one’s own 
state without the fear of any judicial action from justice machinery of the receiving state. The 
types of senior state official’s immunity will be discussed below.  
 
2.4 Types of Immunity of State Officials  
International law allows certain individuals to enjoy immunity. 
Two kinds of immunities are recognised for senior state officials under international law, 
namely, functional immunity (ratione materiae) and personal immunity (ratione personae).  
2.4.1 Functional Immunity 
Functional immunity (ratione materiae) accords protection from any judicial proceedings for 
the sovereign (official) acts that the state officials have undertaken.59 It affords protection to 
public officials from liability for acts performed while executing their official responsibility. 
                                                          
57   Podgor ES and Clark RS (2008) 110. 
58  Akande D and Shah S ‘Immunities of State Official, International Crimes and Foreign Domestic Courts’ 
(2011) 21 European Journal of international Law 821. 
59   Cassese A et al  (2013) 318. 
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The immunity exists because of the assumption that officials perform their tasks on behalf of 
the respective state that they represent. Moreover, since states are equal and no state can 
interfere in the internal matters of other state, public officials enjoy immunity for official acts 
carried out as an agent of the state.60 The allegiance of state officials is clearly with their own 
state and the act performed is considered an ‘act of state’, which is imputable to the state 
and not to the official who has undertaken them.61 According to act of the state doctrine, it 
prevents foreign domestic courts from looking into acts of another state and passing 
judgment as regards to its adherence to international law.62 Functional immunity is an 
apparatus for passing responsibility for the acts of the state official to the state. This has been 
asserted by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. Blaškić, stating that officials are agents of the state and thus cannot 
be sanctioned or penalised for the act that is not private.63 As the official in question does not 
commit the acts for his own benefit, foreign courts have an obligation to grant immunity for 
such acts.64 Otherwise, holding a state official responsible for the acts they carried out on 
behalf of the state would negate the principle of state immunity.65 Accordingly, Article 2 
paragraph 1(b) of the Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of State and Their Property 
assured functional immunity to state officials.66 Functional immunity is enjoyed by officials 
even after lapse of their term. 
                                                          
60   Cassesse A et al International Criminal Law Cases and Commentary (2011) 77. 
61  Cassesse A et al (2011) 77. 
62   Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v Hammer House of Lords (No.3) 888(1982). 
63   Prosecutor v. Blaškić  Judgement On The Request Of The Republic Of Croatia  
        for Review Of The Decision Of Trial Chamber IT-95-14- (1997) Para. 38 
64   Simbeye Y Immunity and International Criminal Law (2004) 109. 
65   Advisory Committee Report on Immunity of Foreign State official, Advisory Report No.20 (2011) 11. 
66   Article 2(1) of the Convention ‘for the purpose of the present convention ….state means… representative 
of state acting that capacity’.  
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Only state organs competent to denote the state with another state can undertake acts of 
state.67 Clearly, head of state is considered to be competent to engage with other states. At 
the same time as representative of the state all acts committed by the head of state could be 
attributed to the state represented. However, this may not always be the case, when state 
officials, especially heads of state, commit crimes, it cannot be considered as acting on behalf 
of the state.68 Individuals committing crimes under international law irrespective of the status 
in the organ of the government is going to be held liable for the acts, since the undertaking 
illegal conducts.69 Functional immunity is conferred to official acts thus state officials cannot 
be immune from responsibility since international crimes are a violation of the  jus cogens 
norm which cannot be imputable to a state act. In the case of Prefecture of Voiatia v Federal 
Republic of Germany, a Greek Court granted a $30 million reparation claim for the death of 
2,000 civilians as a result of a German attack, and conquered the argument that an act in 
violation of jus cogens is not entitled to immunity.70 Consequently, where a state official 
commits a crime under international law, such an official cannot claim immunity ratione 
matariae. Lord Bingham reasoned in the Pinochet case before the Divisional Court that a 
former head of state was clearly entitled to immunity under international law but if such 
officials are immune from being liable for criminal acts, where can one draw the line? It was 
addressed that pertaining to international crimes that act cannot be attributed to the state 
but only to individual and the notion that international crimes could be raised as a defense to 
be an act of state was rejected during the Nuremberg Tribunal.71 
                                                          
67   Simbeye Y (2004) 126. 
68   Simbeye Y (2004) 127. 
69   Simbeye Y (2004) 127. 
70  Pretcture Volotia v Germany Supreme Court of Greece Case no.11 (2000). See also, Akande D and Shah S 
(2011) 829. 
71   Pinochet Ugarte Case (NO.3) (2000)  205. 
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 2.4.2 Personal Immunity  
Personal immunities, unlike functional immunities, are granted only to few senior state 
officials, such as head of state, head of government and minister of foreign affairs, as result 
of the relevance of the official position.72 However, the argument that other officials could be 
entitled has been raised; due to the judgment of the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant Case which 
provided list of officials in illustrative way rather than exhausting the list officials entitled to 
personal immunity.73 According to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the same 
applies for diplomats and member special missions pertaining only to criminal jurisdiction in 
the states where they are accredited to. Personal immunity is enjoyed by the senior officials 
abroad either in official capacity or for private visits.74 In other words, as a matter of rule this 
immunity applies to all forms of senior officials’ conduct. Besides, the immunity applies both 
to the acts that was done before senior officials accredited to office and during their terms of 
office. This establishes full immunity from any judicial process in a foreign state. The crucial 
point is not the nature of the act or when it was undertaken, instead, the senior position hold 
by state officials could be affected by the legal process of a foreign state invoked to subject 
the senior official to judicial process.75 This would arbitrarily interfere in the discharging of 
official functions unless protected by personal immunity.76 
Heads of state are entitled to this immunity as they are considered as an embodiment of a 
state and for sake of smooth international relations they must be capable to act abroad 
                                                          
72   Cassese A et al (2011)  88. 
73  Arrest Warrant Case, ICJ report (2002) Para 51 ‘…certain holders of high ranking officials such as head of 
state, head of government and minister of foreign affairs…’ . 
74   Zappala S (2001) 557. 
75   Akande D and Shah S (2011) 819. 
76   Akande D and Shah S (2011) 819. 
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without any interference.77 The immunity is applicable erga omnes, as an obligation which is 
claimed upon every state.78 Personal immunities encompass every act performed by the 
officials during their term but cease to exist once the person is no longer holding the office.79 
Head of state immunity rationae personae has been a controversial issue in relation to 
international crimes before international tribunals and before foreign courts which will be 
embarked upon in the subsequent chapters of this paper. 
                                                          
77   Akande D and Shah S (2011) 815,821. 
78   Simbeye Y (2004) 115. 
79   Cassese A et al (2011) 88. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
THE LEGAL STATUS OF PERSONAL IMMUNITY OF SITTING HEAD OF 
STATES 
 
 3.1 Personal Immunity of Sitting Head of States before International Criminal Courts 
International law grants personal immunity to limited groups of state officials whose freedom 
is crucial for the proper functioning of the represented state.80 Personal immunity does not 
relinquish criminal liability; rather it curtains prosecution until the official tenure lapses.81 
States are entitled to consent to avoid or limit personal immunity of their officials by allowing 
an International Court or a Tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over their officials.82 The following 
section discusses personal immunity under Statutes of International Tribunals and Hybrid 
Courts established to address atrocities committed in violation of international law. 
    3.1.1 Nuremberg Tribunal 
The Nuremberg Tribunal was established by the 1945 London Agreement for the prosecution 
and punishment of major war crimes of the European axis.83 The Tribunal had jurisdiction to 
try high ranked officials accused of committing crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity.84 It was the first tribunal to hold individuals responsible for crimes against 
humanity after the failed attempt to prosecute German Emperor William II for the atrocities 
committed during the First World War. Although there was no judicial action taken after the 
First World War, the limestone for individual criminal responsibility for head of states and 
                                                          
80    Werle G and Jessberger F (2014) 272  
81    Werle G and Jessberger F (2014) 272. 
82    Advisory Report (2011) 21. 
83    Schabas W International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2010) 5. 
84    Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal.  See also, Beigbeder Y International Justice 
against Impunity: Progress and Challenges (2005) 22. 
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other high ranking state officials were laid down by Article 277 of the Versailles Treaty.85  A 
paradigm shift happened in that individuals could now also be held responsible for 
committing crimes under international law, and not just states as was the norm at that time.86 
Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter established the basis for prosecuting state officials by 
disregarding their official position which entitled them to immunity. The provision reads: 
   ‘Official position of the defendants head of states or responsible official in government   
departments shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating 
punishment’. 
Although high ranking Nazi officials such as Goebbels, Himmler, and Hitler were not 
prosecuted since they committed suicide before the trial, the provision had set a precedent 
for individual criminal responsibility. As a result, the General Assembly Resolution 95(1) re-
affirmed the principle of the Nuremberg Tribunal.87 The above provision is more related to 
functional immunity than personal immunity. Personal immunity of a head of state was never 
an issue before Nuremberg, since indicted Nazi officials were no longer representing Germany 
at the time of trial. 88 The issue of personal immunity was debatable; even after, the First 
World War, as one of the reasons why the US delegates did not agree with the report of the 
Versailles Peace Conference was the fact that jurisdiction could be established over sitting 
heads of state.89 
                                                          
85     Bassiouni MC ‘International Criminal Justice in Historical Perspective: The Tension Between states Interest 
and Pursuit of International Justice’ in Cassesse A The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice 
(2009) 132.  
86   Werle G and Jessberger F (2014) 50-1. 
87   UN General Assembly Resolution 95(1) (1946).  
88   Van Alebeek R The Immunity of States and Their Official in International Criminal Law and International 
Human Rights Law (2008) 226. 
89  Van Alebeek R (2008) 226. 
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    3.1.2 International Military Tribunal for Far East (IMTFE) 
The International Military Tribunal for Far East (hereinafter: IMTFE) was established by the 
proclamation from the commander-in-chief of Allied Forces, Douglas Mac Arthur.90  The 
Tribunal had power to try individuals charged with crimes against peace, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity.91 
With regards to immunity, Article 6 of the IMTFE Charter has abolished immunity for state 
officials and the defence of superior orders. However, contrary to Article 7 of the Nuremberg 
Charter, it has allowed immunity to be used for mitigating sentences of the state officials.92 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Tribunal was empowered to try high ranking officials, the 
Japanese emperor was not tried in return for agreeing to end the war in the Far East.93   
However, both Tribunals focused only on the criminal conducts of the defeated states. 
Consequently, Tribunals faced a lot criticism; one of them being victors justice.94 
    3.1.3 Security Council Ad hoc Tribunals  
Following the grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, International Tribunals were established to try the 
responsible individuals. The mandate of the Tribunals was to prosecute crimes against 
humanity, genocide and war crimes.95 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
                                                          
90   Article 1 of Proclamation by Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo (1946). 
91   Article 5 of IMTFE Statute. 
92   Article 6 of IMTFE Statute provides that …’[s]uch circumstance may be considered to mitigate punishment 
if tribunal determines justice so requires’.  
93   Cryer R and Boister N (eds) Document on the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and 
Judgment (2008) 1.  
94   Cassese A et al (2013) 226. 
95     Beigbeder Y (2005) 45. 
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(hereinafter: ICTR)96and The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(hereinafter: ICTY)97 were the result of the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. Chapter VII of the UN Charter mandates the Security Council to take military 
and non-military actions under Article 41 and Article 42. Consequently, UN member states 
are bound by the decisions of the Council. 98 Following this, the obligation under the Charter 
prevails over any other international obligations.99 As a result, the ICTY and the ICTR were 
established in 1993 and 1994, respectively. 
The ICTY Statute was in effect to prosecute and punish individuals responsible for committing 
grave breaches of the Geneva Convention and its Additional Protocols, beside, genocide, and 
crimes against humanity.100 The domestic courts also had jurisdiction over those responsible 
for these crimes; however, the Tribunals had primacy over national courts.101 
Concerning the immunity enjoyed by state officials under customary international law, it was 
trumped by the obligation of states towards the UN Charter. In the same vein as the other 
Tribunals discussed above, the Statute clearly deals with functional immunity and provides 
that an official position cannot relieve any of the officials from responsibility as well as 
mitigate punishment.102 Although there is no specific provision that deals with personal 
immunity, Slobodan Milosevic was indicted while he was still sitting head of state of the 
                                                          
96   Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993) (as amended on 17 May 
2002).  
97     Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994) (as last amended on 13 October 2006). 
98   Article 27 of UN Charter. 
99   Article 103 of UN Charter. 
100   Article 1-5 of the ICTY Statute. 
101   Article 9 of ICTY Statute. 
102   Article 7(2) of ICTY Statute. 
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter: FRY)103 thus, applying the principle that personal 
immunity had no standing before the court. Nevertheless, Milosevic had appealed to the 
Court alleging immunity for his status as the president of FRY and he also contested the power 
of the Council to establish the Tribunal.104 The Tribunal addressed the objection in light of the 
Tadic Case before the Appeal Chamber. Pursuant to Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Appeal 
Chamber argued that the SC is empowered to adopt measures in order to discharge its 
obligation to maintain peace and order under Article 39. The Tribunal also established that 
the list of measures provided under Article 41 was not exhaustive, and that the SC may avail 
other measures to maintain peace and order.105 While addressing Milosevic’s objection on 
the ground of immunity, the Tribunal stated Article 7(2) of the ICTY Statute as a reflection of 
customary international law and the Tribunal also mentioned the development of individual 
responsibility since Nuremberg has set the trend for the removal of immunity before 
International Tribunals.106 As a result, the Tribunal dismissed the objection of the accused.107 
The Tribunal has also prosecuted other high ranking officials like, Karadzic108 and Kunara.109 
The genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994 led to the establishment of ICTR.110 The 
Court had jurisdiction over crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes 
                                                          
103   Prosecutor v Milosevic et al Case no. IT-99-37 indictment, See also, Prosecutor v Milosevic ICTY ,Case no.IT-
02-54T, Decision on Preliminary motion, ICTY trial Chamber Decision (2001) Para 26-34. 
104   Prosecutor V Dragoljub Kunarac Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic Case No.: IT-96-23 & 
IT-96-23/1-A ICTY Appeals Chamber (2002). 
105   Prosecutor v. Milosevic (2001) Para 5-7. 
106   Prosecutor v. Milosevic(2001) Para 28-33. 
107   Prosecutor v. Milosevic(2001) Para 34. 
108   Prosecutor v Karadzic Decision on the Accused Holbrook agreement motion, ICTY Trial chamber case no. 
IT-95-5/18-PT (2009) Para 5. See also, Prosecutor v Karadizic, Appeal of Decision Concerning Holbrook 
Agreement Disclosure ICTY Appeal Chamber Case no. IT-95 5/18-PT,(2009) Para 8-12. 
109   Prosecutor V Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic Case No.: IT-96-23& 
IT-96-23/1-T ICTY  (2001) Para 4-11. 
110   UN General Assembly Resolution 955(1994). 
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committed in Rwanda and similar crimes committed in neighbouring states by Rwandan 
citizens between January and December 1994.111 Similar to the ICTY, the national courts also 
had jurisdiction, but the ICTR had primacy over domestic courts.112 
Concerning immunity, the ICTR has also removed the immunity of higher state officials.113 
Consequently, the former prime minister of Rwanda Jean Kambanda was prosecuted before 
the tribunal.114 Unlike Milosevic, Kambada did not raise the issue of immunity, but pleaded 
guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment.115 
 3.2 The International Criminal Court  
International Tribunals discussed in the preceding section have clearly paved the way for the 
establishment of the first ever permanent international criminal court. Prior tribunals have 
established a rich body of procedural and substantive law that has helped the International 
Criminal Court with its jurisprudence.116 The Rome Statute of ICC was adopted in Rome in July 
1998 after acquiring 60 ratifications.117 It is a multilateral international treaty that has become 
the main document for international criminal law today.118 The Statute provides an 
independent and permanent jurisdiction with power to adjudicate the most serious 
                                                          
111   Article 1-4 of ICTR Statute. 
112   Article 8(2) of ICTR Statute. 
113   Article 6(2)of  ICTR  Statute.  
114   Prosecutor v Kambanda Case no. ITCR-97-23-S  ICTR Trial Chamber I, Judgment (1998). 
115   Prosecutor v Kambanda (1998). 
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international crimes. The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes of genocide119, crimes against 
humanity120, war crimes,121 and the crime of aggression.122 
According to Article 11 of the Statute, the Court has jurisdiction only over crimes committed 
after 1 July 2002. The jurisdiction of the Court is pursuant to the principle of 
complementarity.123 This principle stipulates that domestic courts of states parties shall have 
primacy. It is only when the state is unable or unwilling to genuinely carry out an investigation 
and prosecution that the ICC acquires jurisdiction with regards to the matter.124 This can only 
be determined by the ICC, not by the state party.125 In other words, the ICC is a court of last 
resort, which is envisioned to complement domestic jurisdiction.126 Furthermore, the 
principle of complementarity is an important component of the ICC in light of the efficiency 
and effectiveness to adjudicate cases, since states have upfront access to evidence and 
witnesses.127 The Court’s jurisdiction is triggered by three different mechanisms: firstly, by 
state referral, which is a state referring its own situation to the court.128 The Statute creates 
a treaty obligation that is only applicable to a state party since the treaty creates neither 
obligation nor rights for third   party states without their consent.129 Secondly, propio motu 
where  the ICC prosecutor pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute conducts preliminary 
examination and then request the Pre-Trial Chamber to launch an investigation. Finally, the 
                                                          
119   Article 5 of Rome Statute. 
120   Article 6 of Rome Statute. 
121   Article 7 of Rome Statute. 
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UNSC referral, under Chapter VII, is the third triggering mechanism for the ICC jurisdiction.130 
The UNSC is able to refer a situation to the Prosecutor and this avoids setting up Ad-hoc 
Tribunals for every conflict. 
With regard to immunity, the Rome Statute has followed the trends of previous International 
Tribunals. To that end, the Statute in the quest to end impunity for perpetrators and prevent 
international crimes131 has taken firm measures in disregarding immunity. Article 27 (1) of the 
Statute reads: 
This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official 
capacity as head of state or government, a member of a Government or parliament, an 
elected representative or a government  official shall in no case  exempt a person from 
criminal responsibility under this Statute nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground 
for reduction of sentence. 
The above provision is fundamentally similar to all the international tribunals that came into 
existence since Nuremberg as it avoids substantive immunity of state officials before 
international courts. However, unlike the previous International Tribunals’ Statutes, the Rome 
Statute has also dealt with personal immunity of state officials under Article 27(2):    
Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a   
person whether under national or international law shall not be bar the court from 
exercising its jurisdiction over such person. 
                                                          
130   Article 16 of Rome Statute.   
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Thus, upon ratification, states parties renounce the personal immunity that their officials 
would have otherwise enjoyed under customary international law.132 The provision 
renounces immunity in national and international law since the jurisdiction of the court is 
reliant on the co-operation of state parties in arrest and surrender of indicted individuals.133 
Accordingly, states parties cannot hide their officials behind national immunity provided 
under the domestic law.  
 3.3 Hybrid Courts   
   3.3.1 The Extraordinary Chamber of Cambodia 
 The Chamber was established to try individuals responsible for genocide and crimes against 
humanity committed during the Khmer Rouge regime between 1975-1979.134 It is a hybrid 
court established by agreement with the UN and later approved by the Cambodian 
Parliament.135 The Chamber also had a jurisdiction over crimes of homicide, torture and 
religious persecution according to the Cambodian Penal Code.136 It had  jurisdiction over 
crimes of genocide, crime against humanity, and destruction of cultural property of 
international protected persons.137 The law of the Chamber had stipulated under Article 9 
that the position or rank of the suspects will not relieve or mitigate punishment.  The Chamber 
prosecuted its own nationals. Hence it is clear that the issue of international immunity did not 
arise in the Extraordinary Chamber of Cambodia. 
                                                          
132   Schabas W (2010) 448. 
133   Akande D (2004) 420. 
134   UN General Assembly Resolution 52/135, Letter from the Secretary General to the President of General 
Assembly, UN/Doc/52/1007 (1998) . 
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   3.3.2 Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
Following the terrorist attack in Beirut that killed Prime Minister Ratik and 22 others, the 
government requested the SC to establish a tribunal on December 13, 2005.138  The 
establishment of the Tribunal is  a result of an agreement concluded with the UN. 
Unfortunately, the political crisis in the government, could not bring  the ratification of the 
agreement by the parliament.139 As a result, the UNSC acting under Chapter VII brought the 
agreement into force.140 The Statute of the Tribunal under Article 3 provides for individual 
criminal responsibility. However, immunities of heads of state of third states were not 
affected as it did not contain any provision that removes immunities. 
   3.3.3 Special Court for Sierra Leone 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (hereinafter: SCSL) was established as the result of the 
request of the Sierra Leone government to the international community to establish the 
‘Special Court for Sierra Leone’ to prosecute the atrocities committed by leaders of the rebel 
Revolutionary United Front.141 Thus, UNSC Resolution 1315 provided the foundation for the 
Court and upheld the need to hold individuals responsible for the violation of international 
crimes.142 Subsequently, the legal framework of the court was set out in the agreement signed 
between the UN and the government of Sierra Leone on 16 January 2002.143 
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The Court issued an indictment for the then incumbent head of state of Liberia, Charles Taylor, 
for crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.144 Before he 
stepped down, he filed an application claiming that he was protected by personal immunity 
since the SCSL was not a product of Chapter VII of the UNSC Resolution, hence, not an 
International Tribunal as it was referred in the Arrest Warrant Case.145  
The Court rejected the application asserting that immunity does not apply before the 
jurisdiction of an international court and explained that the SCSL is outside the national legal 
system of Sierra Leone, established because of the situation in Sierra Leone posed a threat to 
international peace.146 Thus, engendering its competence and jurisdiction in the similar 
manner to that of ICTY, ITCR and ICC.147 The Court held that the immunity Taylor enjoyed as 
an incumbent head of state is not a bar for prosecution by the court. Similarly, the SCSL 
Statute has also renounced immunity under Article 6(2) and the Court asserted that it cannot 
ignore what is laid down in the Statute unless there exists a provision that goes against the 
peremptory norm of international law.148 
 
   3.3.4 The Extraordinary African Chamber 
It was the first universal jurisdiction case where a former head of state was convicted by an 
African Court. Under the regime of Hissene Habre, from 1982 to 1990, Chad experienced 
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serious human rights violations. 149 However, attempts to prosecute him before national 
courts of Chad and Senegal failed short.150 Victims approached the Brussel District Court in 
Belgium, which led to an international arrest warrant against Habre, however the Senegalese 
Government refused the extradition request.151 The Appeal Court refused to extradite relying 
on the immunity of Habre, which had actually been waived by the Chad government.152 Thus, 
no issue of immunity was raised before the Chamber since immunity was waived by the state. 
In the end, the AU got involved and allowed Senegal to establish the Extraordinary African 
Chamber (hereinafter EAC).153 The Chamber found the former Chadian leader guilty of crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and torture for which he was sentenced to life 
imprisonment.154 
3.4 The African Court of Justice and Human Rights  
African states were huge supporters of the idea of establishing the ICC when it was 
conceived.155 The participation of African states ranged from hosting conferences to adapting 
declarations that attested their full commitment to the process. In the Rome Conference, 8 
out of the 31 delegates were from African countries, namely: Algeria, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, 
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Burkina Faso, Egypt, Gabon, while Egypt was even assigned to chair the drafting committee.156 
African states took an active part and they were the primal states to sign and ratify the treaty 
allowing the continent to have the largest number of representatives in the Assembly.157 
However, in the past decade, the ICC has been criticised by African states for its focus on the 
continent. The recurring conflicts in African states and the three  situations which resulted in 
the jurisdiction of the Court were self-referral of African states,158 nevertheless, the Court’s 
lack of jurisdiction to undertake  investigation and prosecution in areas deserving its attention 
such as Palestine, Syria and the fact that half UNSC states are not a party to the Statute has 
led to the persisted criticism. 159 
The arrest warrant issued against Al-Bashir intensified the situation between Africa and the 
ICC.160 The AU made the decision that African states will not co-operate with the ICC in the 
arrest and surrender of the incumbent head of state of Sudan. Following the arrest warrant 
of the ICC, the AU requested the deferral by UNSC pursuant to Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute.161 Nevertheless, the request was denied resulting in the AU’s decision not to co-
operate with the ICC pertaining to the arrest and surrender of the Sudanese president Al-
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Bashir.162 Consequently, the tension between the AU and the ICC had brought about the idea 
for establishing a Regional Criminal Court to address African problems by an African Court.163 
In 2014, the AU adopted a protocol that extends the jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights to address serious crimes under international law in Malabo, Equatorial 
Guinea.164 
Although the efforts to establish a Regional Court were admired by commentators because 
the latter fills the jurisdictional gap of the ICC,  there were serious  questions raised concerning 
the motive of the AU.165 The criticism ranged from the closed policy followed to the decision 
of non-involvement of the civil society and non-governmental organisations  from the drafting 
stage to the feasibility of three Chambers staffed with the same judges to address 14 
international crimes.166 Furthermore, the apprehension on the Protocol is fuelled as result of 
Article 46abis which reads: 
No charges shall be commenced or continued before the court against any serving AU head 
of state, Government or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity or other senior 
state officials based on their functions, during their tenure of office. 
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Accordingly, the Protocol has chosen to grant personal immunity to sitting heads of states. 
This clearly shows the different approach taken from the preceding treaties establishing 
International Tribunals. The Court’s relation to the ICC and its impact on the international law 
will be further analysed in the next chapter of the thesis. 
3.5 Sitting Head of States Immunity under Customary International law  
Customary international law is one of the most prominent forms of international law 
following treaties. It is a ‘general and consistent practice of states followed by a sense of legal 
obligation’.167 Precedent and scholarly writings are also a supplementary means of 
determining rules of international law.168 Nonetheless, it should not be conceived that 
scholarly writings could solely be the source of customary international law in the absence of 
the state practice. Thus, states conform to customary international law and incorporate the 
norms into their domestic law. For customary international law to exist, there must be a 
prevalent and constant practice of states and opinio juris that explains why states act in 
accordance with the regulatory framework.169Scholars and courts affirm that an established 
state practice among states ‘ripens’ or ‘hardens’  into customary international law that 
becomes recognised by states as legal binding laws. 
As discussed in the first chapter, state immunity is rooted in the principles of international 
law by virtue of treaties or conventions that give rise to fundamental state rights. Moreover, 
this practice has given rise to customary international law.170 Accordingly, judicial decisions 
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of courts are a clear example of state practices and can be raised to be evidence of opinio juris 
with regard to state immunity.171 Akande asserts that both state practice and judicial 
decisions are unanimous with regard to personal immunity.172 However, as discussed in the 
previous section, the issue of immunity under customary law has encountered development 
through the emergence and development of international criminal law. As a result, the status 
of immunity under customary international has to be viewed from to two different angles, 
when it raised before international criminal courts and when it is before foreign domestic 
courts.   
As it was addressed in the previous section, the concept of immunity before International 
Tribunals has been eroded and this argument has also been substantiated by precedents of 
the International Tribunals. However, the personal immunity of a sitting head of state before 
a domestic court is still a matter that is hotly contested. 
   3.5.1 Immunities before Domestic Courts 
The principle of immunity of a head of state under one’s own domestic court could vary 
according to the country’s national laws. Even if heads of states are granted immunity under 
customary international law, countries, in light of their constitution, can limit or even 
renounce the immunity. For Instance, Belgium173, Botswana174, and Sudan175 provide full 
immunity to their sitting heads of states. In contrast, the UK’s head of state is not entitled to 
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such immunity since the prime minister is subject to questioning and investigation. The US, 
on the other hand, entitles its head of state a limited immunity.176  
However, the focus of this thesis is international immunities and not domestic immunity 
under national law, thus an elaborate discussion on domestic immunities under this section 
will not be undertaken as it is beyond the focus of the topic. 
   3.5.2 Sitting Head of States Personal Immunity before Foreign Domestic Courts 
As a result of the development of the principle of universal jurisdiction, which rectifies the 
limitations or lack of international adjudicatory bodies, domestic courts have been crucial in 
undertaking international proceedings.177 
State immunity is extended to a head of state as an embodiment of the state in order to 
undertake official conducts effectively and efficiently. Nevertheless, the immunity of a sitting 
head of state varies before the courts of the state of origin and before a foreign domestic 
court. While the former is dealt by the domestic law of the country, the latter is governed by 
principles of international law. In dealing with judicial decisions pertaining to the personal 
immunity of senior officials accused of crimes under international law, the House of Lords has 
asserted in the Pinochet Case that the reason provided for disregarding functional immunity 
did not affect personal immunity of the senior officials.178 Besides, the Spanish Court, 
Audiencia Nacional, in the case against Fidel Castro for crimes under international law, 
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asserted that criminal jurisdiction could not be exercised since an incumbent head of state 
enjoys immunity.179 
Thus, the notion that a sitting head of state is immune from the criminal jurisdiction of foreign 
national courts, is a widely accepted doctrine.180 The assertion has also been confirmed by 
the decision of the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant Case.181 
3.5.2.1 The Arrest Warrant Case 
Belgium adopted a criminal legislation which recognises neither functional nor procedural 
immunity for crimes under international law. Subsequently, an international arrest warrant 
was issued by Belgium for the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(hereinafter: DRC) Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombas.182 He was accused of inciting hate speech 
against the Tutsi Population in the DRC which resulted in hundreds of deaths and summary 
executions.183  In response to the arrest warrant, the DRC brought an application before the 
ICJ alleging Belgium has violated its right by issuing a warrant against its minister all in while 
protected by immunity.184 Belgium argued that according to the Nuremberg Charter and the 
Rome Statute, incumbent ministers of foreign affairs cannot raise immunity as defence where 
the individual is accused of having committed war crimes and crimes against humanity.185 The 
Court ruled that personal immunity is an absolute immunity. The court cited domestic 
legislation and previous judicial decisions including that from the House of Lords in Pinochet’s 
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case and  from the French Court of Cassation, were unable to reach the conclusion that there 
exists an exception developed for personal immunity under customary international law.186 
The Court also concluded that the instruments of International Criminal Tribunals such as 
Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter, could not allow it to conclude that an exception exists 
under customary international law.187 Thus, according to the court’s decision, the difference 
between procedural and functional immunity have been differentiated as separate concepts 
since jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature while criminal responsibility is a question 
of substantive law. 188Therefore, the irrelevance of official capacity under customary 
international law did not affect the personal immunity of senior officials. Subsequently, the 
Court emphasised the fact that the decision was not contrary to the principle of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, the Tokyo Tribunal and the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia.189 
Hence, the court submitted that Belgium, issuing an arrest warrant and circulating it, was a 
clear violation of the principle of the international law.190 However, Judge Van den Wyngaert  
in her dissenting opinion argued that the principle of irrelevance of official capacity is an issue 
of individual versus state responsibility, and not personal and functional immunity.191 She 
insisted that official capacity is not solely for making officials accountable but it also 
guarantees jurisdiction to the court. Her argument is not stating that the principle affects 
personal immunity directly, however, she justifies for the interest of preventing impunity; the 
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latter should outweigh the interest of protected personal immunity.192 Van Alebeek responds 
to this argument that judges can establish changing circumstances through judicial decisions, 
however, this does not mean that the judge can go against state practice to balance the 
interest protected by personal immunity and with the interest of fighting impunity, the 
decision can only reflect what the law states not what law should be.193 
On the basis of state practice, it is only the United States that does not recognise personal 
immunity limitations to prosecution. Pertaining to the rule of immunity, the United States 
proclaims that a head of state immunity is only about grace and comity not a right provided 
to a head of state to escape criminal liability.194 Besides, the ‘Flatow Amendment’195 also 
asserts that US courts could disregard immunity of heads of states who are believed to be 
labelled as a sponsor of terrorism. 196 
To sum up, before a foreign domestic court, personal immunity is an obstacle for the 
prosecution of state officials. Thus, without existing state practices, no exception has been 
developed for the prosecution of an incumbent state official for crimes under international 
law.197 In the Arrest Warrant Case, the Court provided the only circumstance in which state 
officials enjoy procedural immunity and are able to be brought before the jurisdiction of a 
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foreign state: if the state in question waives its immunity; otherwise the official is 
protected.198  
 
 
3.6 Personal Immunity under International Law Commissions 
The International Law Commission (ILC) is a permanent body that was established in 
November 1947 by the UN.199 The Commission started with a limited number of members 
and through the years, the members have increased. It has contributed different articles 
pertaining to immunity with regard to clarifying and establishing uniform understanding and 
application of international law. The Commission contributed significantly towards the 
formulation of the Nuremberg Principles which was later affirmed by the resolution.200  
The argument that international law has reached a stage where immunity should no longer 
be a hurdle for crimes under international law is persisting.201  However, some argue against 
this assertion by mentioning the political and practical difficulties in permitting domestic 
courts to prosecute officials of foreign states.202 The controversial issue of allowing domestic 
courts with jurisdiction over foreign leaders has led to the International Law Commission to 
include it in its work programme.203 
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The International Law Commission adopted three draft articles that identify the head of state, 
head of government and foreign minister enjoy immunity before foreign courts for both 
private and public acts and the immunity ceases once the officials leave office.204 Besides the 
provisionally adopted three articles, the Commission awaits subsequent reports that explore 
possible exceptions to immunity and procedural matters. The only recognised exception so 
far is the waiver of immunity by the government of the officials.205 Thus, whether other 
exceptions could emerge, according to the ILC is not yet clear. However, ILC has clarified on 
one hand avoiding responsibility for crimes under international law are unacceptable, on the 
other hand immunity is necessary since the peaceful international relations of states is crucial 
to avoid domestic court allegations driven not by justice, but politics.206 
Although the Commission held in its sixty-sixth  and sixty-seventh sessions in 2014 and 2015 
respectively, the focus area of both sessions was, namely, what are the elements of immunity 
ratione matriae and what amounts to ‘official acts’. Therefore, the issue of personal immunity 
was not further addressed.  
3.7 Limitation to Personal Immunity under Treaty Obligations 
In overcoming the atrocities of the Second World War, the international community was very 
vigilant to protect individuals from atrocities perpetrated by the state. This resulted in the 
promulgation of different human rights conventions. The obligation to extradite or prosecute 
is laid down in different conventions. 
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The Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide207(hereinafter: 
Genocide Convention) was adopted in the wake of the Nuremberg Trial to establish individual 
responsibility for the crimes of genocide.208  It provides that persons committing genocide 
should be held responsible whether there are constitutionally responsible rulers, public 
officials or private persons.209 According to Article 4 of the Convention, responsible rulers and 
public officials cannot raise immunity as a defence to shield them from criminal responsibility. 
Individual criminal responsibility under the Convention has been established placing duties 
on the state to prosecute or extradite.210 Customary international law recognises that the 
state in which the crime under international law has been committed has a duty to prosecute 
under treaty law.211 Nonetheless, the crime of genocide is committed with the collusion of 
the state itself so it is less likely the state will take initiative to try the matter in a national 
court. Therefore, there has been an evolution of the principle of universal jurisdiction which 
allows states to exercise jurisdiction over the crime. 
Beside the Genocide Convention, the Convention against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman 
Degrading Treatment (hereinafter: Torture Convention)212 also imposes an obligation on 
states parties to undertake judicial measures to prevent torture. The Convention also clearly 
stipulates that superior orders or public authority cannot be invoked as a defence for the act 
of torture.213 The Convention also provides an obligation on a state party to prosecute or 
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extradite suspected offenders, including non-nationals who are in the territory of the state 
party.214 
The Convention for Protection of All Forms of Enforced Disappearance also provides that 
deprivation of liberty of individual by a state official as enforced disappearance, at the same 
time, Article 9 of the Convention also provides that a state party to take measures needs to 
have a jurisdiction over the responsible individual. The state party must try the suspect in its 
territory or extradite the individual to another state for a trial.215 
In addition, the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid216 describes apartheid as a crime against humanity.217 It provides for individual 
criminal responsibility irrespective of motive, membership of the organisation and status as 
representative of the state.218 
As it has been noted, all the above international treaties, clearly provide individual criminal 
responsibility for state officials. Therefore states parties are either competent or obliged to 
prosecute or extradite responsible individuals regardless of them being state officials. 219 
However, the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant Case, has clearly asserted that various conventions 
impose an obligation on states to either extradite or prosecute such an extension of the 
criminal jurisdiction of states and should not affect immunity of state officials under 
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customary international law.220 On this basis, the personal immunity of a head of state cannot 
be affected by foreign jurisdiction as a result of the treaty obligation to prosecute or extradite.  
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
 EXPLORING THE EXISTENCE OF CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS 
 The notion of personal immunity is contained within the Rome Statute and is not to a shield 
for criminal responsibility. In the same token, the court has indicted sitting senior officials for 
prosecution; nevertheless, it was unable to bring them before the jurisdiction of the Court. 
The Court is established by a treaty law and immunity under customary international law is 
still persisting, achieving a clear understanding of the personal immunity of senior officials 
and acquiring co-operation of states parties still seems to be challenging. 
This Chapter deals with circumstances where non-co-operation of member states is 
attributed to conflicting obligations of states parties to the Rome Statute and to their 
obligation under customary international law. The Rome Statute is a treaty law between 
consenting states. However it has an implication on non-member states when the jurisdiction 
of the Court is triggered by UNSC Council. Although Al Bashir is not the first sitting head of 
state to be indicted before the Court since Gadaffi’s indictment has become mute as result of 
his death, this paper will only focus on Al Bashir indictment.  
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4.1 Indictment of Sitting Head of State of a State Party to the Rome Statute  
The primacy of international criminal law is to hold individuals accountable under 
international law.221 Thus, the ICC has set out the core crimes and has established 
responsibility for individuals who fall under the jurisdiction of the Court.  It is clear that states 
parties to the Rome Statute have agreed that the immunity enjoyed by their heads of the 
states will not be a bar for  prosecution before the ICC. Therefore, a state party may abolish 
the immunity of another state party in order to assist the Court. Article 27 abrogates not only 
international immunity but also national immunity of the official, which is mainly significant 
to the process of arrest and surrender, since if the state official’s national immunity is still 
intact, the structure of the ICC will be pointless.222  
In order for the ICC to establish its jurisdiction, the role of states cannot be undermined.223 As 
a result, the Rome Statute establishes a detailed structure under part 9 of the Statute which 
sets out procedures for the Court to request the arrest and surrender of indicted individuals. 
This part of the Statute sets out obligations on member states to cooperate with the ICC. 
Article 86 of the Rome Statute clearly identifies the obligations of member states to cooperate 
fully in the investigation  as well as prosecution. Moreover, the obligation to cooperate fully 
is further clarified under Article 89 that it incorporates arrest and surrender of individuals for 
prosecution.   
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4.2 Indictment of Sitting Head of State of a Non- State Party to the Rome Statute  
In light of Article 27 of Rome Statute, official status is irrelevant before the Court. Although 
the Statute renounces immunity of sitting head of states of states parties, this provision does 
not extend to non-states parties unless the state consented to the jurisdiction of the Court.224 
As already mentioned, the ICC is a treaty based court where member states have willingly 
accepted and ratified the principles of the Statute. Thus, non-member states have not ratified 
the treaty, which implies that they have not renounced their official right to immunity. This is 
a principle that can easily be inferred from the Vienna Convention Article 34 which provides 
a treaty cannot be extended to a third state. 
Nevertheless, one of the triggering mechanisms for the jurisdiction of the Court is a UNSC 
referral under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Thus, a sitting head of state of a non-member 
state can be indicted before the Court. Under customary international law, a head of state is 
entitled to immunity under a domestic court if not under an international court. As discussed 
in the second chapter, an incumbent head of state is protected from any criminal jurisdiction 
including arrest under a foreign domestic court.225 This right has also been confirmed as an 
absolute right even when the indictment is for crimes under international law in light of the 
Arrest Warrant Case.226 Thus the issue to ponder upon is whether multilateral treaties can 
side-step personal immunity of a non-state party established under customary International 
law. Different scholars forward different lines of argument. Some asserts a treaty based 
International Tribunal is unable to renounce immunity that customary international law 
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entitles to the state official provided that the state is not a party to the Rome Statute.227 
However, customary law is the default rule, and states are entitled to contract with each other 
out of the customary law according to their agreement.228 Consequently, states have come 
together to limit immunity of their officials pursuant to the Rome Statute. The following 
question arises: what is the impact of the Statute on a non-state party when the UNSC is 
involved in the referral? In order to answer this question, first we have to undertake a 
discussion on the UNSC referral of the Darfur situation and its impact on head of state 
immunity of a non-state party to the Rome Statute. 
4.2.1 UNSC Referral of the Darfur Situation 
The human rights violations in Darfur by the government engendered in the UNSC 
determining the situation as a threat to international peace and security.229 Consequently, 
the UNSC laid down an obligation on the state of Sudan to cease the violations and bring the 
responsible individuals to justice.230 The Council noted that a failure to take measures by 
Sudan could result in resort to military or other measures according to Article 41 of the 
Charter.231 Subsequently Sudan’s failure to take measures to stop the atrocities led to the 
UNSC Resolution 1564,232 which established an inquiry committee to investigate the human 
rights violations and also to determine if acts of genocide occurred in Darfur.233 The 
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Commission’s Report234 affirmed the alleged violations and provided recommendations for 
the case to be referred to the ICC.235  The UNSC passed a resolution triggering the jurisdiction 
of ICC.236 The involvement of the UNSC clearly shows that it is exercising its power under 
Article 41 of UN Charter to maintain peace and security by employing measures other than 
the use of force.237 This initiated the public prosecutor’s investigation of the situation of 
Darfur in 2005.238 This was followed by the issuance of an arrest warrant by the Pre-trail 
Chamber (hereinafter PTC) of the ICC against the sitting head of state of Sudan.  
  4.2.1.1 PTC’s Decision to Issue an Arrest Warrant 
The PTC, in its decision against the sitting head of state of Sudan, Al-Bashir, clarified that the 
immunity enjoyed as a non-state party to the Rome Statute has no implication in the Court’s 
Jurisdiction.239  The Chamber provided four reasons for its decision. The first, PTC affirmed 
that the UNSC referring the Darfur situation to the Court pursuant to Article 13(b) has also 
accepted that the investigation into the situation, as well as the prosecution arising from the 
investigation, will take place in accordance with the statuary framework of the Rome 
Statute.240 Second, the Chamber provided that the preamble of the Rome Statute as another 
ground for it decision which states the need to end impunity by bringing responsible 
individuals for crimes under international law before the jurisdiction of the Court.241  Third, 
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reasoning of the Chamber, provides in order to achieve the goal of the Statue, the Chamber 
asserts Article 27 as an essential principle that needs to be accorded.242 Finally, the Chamber 
stressed the predominance of rules of the Statute over other sources of international law.243 
However, the reasoning of the Chamber has been criticised by a number of legal scholars. The 
Chamber has justified the removal of sitting heads of state immunity of non-state parties by 
resorting to the preamble of the Statute which is not a very convincing reasoning as the 
preamble is not binding even to member states let alone to non-state parties.244 However, 
this reasoning of the Chamber can be viewed as indication that claiming immunity or entitling 
immunity for Al Bashir as going against the fundamental purpose of the Statute.245 As the 
purpose of the Statute is to fight impunity for crimes under international law as described by 
the Chamber. The other rationalisation asserted by the Chamber confirmed Article 27 as an 
essential principle for the jurisdiction of the Court, however, the Chamber fails to address 
how this provision applies to non-state parties to the Rome Statute.246 The Chamber also 
stated the primacy of the Statute from other sources of international law, which is confusing 
since the Statute itself expressly provides the applicability of other sources of international 
law and also makes reference to immunity under international law in Article 98.247 However, 
the explanation of the Chamber which explains for the UNSC referral of Sudan’s situation to 
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the Court, subjects a state to the provisions of the Rome Statute is more convincing compared 
to the other reasoning.248 
On the basis of the above reasoning, it is clear to see that the Chamber did not lay a strong 
foundation to substantiate its decision and did not at the same time emphasise the effects of 
the UNSC referral which will be discussed below 
  4.2.1.2 The Effect of Security Council Resolution 1593 on Al Bashir’s Immunity 
The UNSC Resolution 1593 brought about the indictment of an incumbent head of state of a 
non-state party before the Court. Indicting a sitting head of state before an international 
tribunal is not unprecedented. As mentioned before, the ICTY issued an arrest warrant for 
Milosevic while he was an incumbent head of state of the former Yugoslavia and the SCSL also 
indicted Charles Taylor while he was still office.249 It goes without saying that the referral of 
the UNSC expects the Court to take up the investigation and prosecution of Al Bahir.250 
However, due to the lack of enforcement personnel (in the form of ICC security/police), arrest 
and surrender can only be affected by state co-operation according to Section 9 of the Rome 
Statute. This raises the issue of a non-state party’s immunity in which Al Bashir claims he is 
entitled to.  Does this situation give rise to a conflicting or competing obligation? In order to 
address this, the effect of referral has to be addressed.  
First, the power of the UNSC referral of a situation of a non-state party emanates from the 
UNSC’s power to maintain global peace and security, as enumerated under Article 39 of UN 
Charter. Provided a situation arises that threaten the world peace and security, the Council 
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has the mandate to take measures to ensure peace and security and eliminate the threat. 
Coming to the case at hand, the UNSC council was under the impression that the Darfur 
situation was a threat to peace and security of the international community. As a result, the 
Council, in order to maintain stability of the country and avoid further insecurity referred the 
situation to the ICC.  According to Article 25 of UN Charter, UN member states have an 
obligation under the Charter to accept and carry out the decision of the Council. Thus the 
extension of the ICC jurisdiction to a non-member state by the UNSC referral has to be 
accepted by the states as they have an obligation under the UN Charter. In the same token, 
the jurisdiction of the ICC which encompasses the investigation and prosecution of 
responsible individuals is going to be undertaken according to the Rome Statute. 
Consequently, this subjects Sudan to the rules and principles of the Statute and this was 
confirmed by the UNSC’s request to ‘cooperate fully’.251 The Provision of the Statute which 
avoids both international and national immunities of incumbent head of states will be 
applicable to Sudan’s President. However, Sudan’s obligation to act according to the Rome 
Statute and cooperate with the ICC is not the result of the extension of the treaty obligation 
to unconsented third states, rather, the obligation of Sudan ascends from the UNSC resolution 
and the UN Charter.252 
Sudan’s obligation to cooperate can be understood as waiving the immunity of the sitting 
head of state and surrendering him to ICC. Had Sudan granted waiver of immunity this will 
allow the states parties to effect the arrest and surrender Al Bashir while he is in their 
territory. Nonetheless, Sudan did not waive the immunity of its official, but does this then 
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imply that Al Bashir’s immunity is still protected? Because if he is, then it will bring conflicting 
obligations to states who take measures to effect his arrest and surrender. 
  4.2.1.3 Does Duty to Co-operate by the States Parties invites Conflicting Obligations? 
  
With regard to state parties to the Rome Statute, their obligation to co-operate with the Court 
has clearly been provided under Article 86 with an obligation to assist the Court in its 
investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. Thus, the 
obligation to co-operate for the states parties is not the outcome of the resolution rather a 
ratified duty under the Statute. 
However, the issue of the member states duty to co-operate with the arrest and surrender of 
a sitting head of state of a non-state party has been a very controversial issue. Gaeta argues 
that a member state to the Rome Statute is not under an obligation to undertake the arrest 
and surrender of Al Bashir since Sudan has not waived the immunity of Al Bashir, 
consequently bringing a conflicting obligation which entitles states not to cooperate 
according to Article 98 of the Rome Statute,253 which reads: 
 ‘The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require 
the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with 
respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the 
Court can first obtain the co-operation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.’  
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The provision provides an obligation on the court to obtain the co-operation of the third state 
by getting waiver of immunity for its officials. Unless the Court acquires the states waiver of 
immunity of the official, it should not proceed with the request in order to avoid conflicting 
obligations of states under international law. 
The term ‘third state’ has not been clarified whether it indicates the non-member states or 
not. In light of the interpretation of the Vienna Convention Law of Treaties, ‘third state’ 
indicates to non-member states to a treaty.254 Similarly, Akande also asserts ‘third state’ 
under Article 98 represents a non-state party to the Rome Statute, he also explains giving a 
different meaning to the ‘ third state’ other than non-states parties, it will  make Article 27 
mute.255 With the same token, states parties to the Rome Statute had willingly renounced  
their immunity while ratifying the Statute, it will be inconsistent to assume Article 98 can be 
raised in relation to the member states.  Sudan as a non-state party to the Rome Statute falls 
under the category of a ‘third state’. As a result, enjoys immunity under customary 
international law if we pursue the argument that pursuant to Article 98  Sudan did not waive 
immunity of Al Bashir, therefore he is still protected or entitled to immunity under customary 
law. Then he will not be subjected to the arrest and surrender when he travels to other states 
parties’ territory. This argument has been asserted by most African countries for the failure 
to arrest and surrender Al Bashir whilst in their territory. 
However, the situation of Sudan has been  referred by the UNSC resolution 1593 which reads; 
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‘The government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Sudan shall co-operate fully 
with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and prosecutor to this resolution…’ 
According to the words of the resolution ‘shall co-operate fully’ asserts a mandatory 
obligation. Thus, Sudan is under an obligation to waive the immunity of its head of state to 
assist the Court according to the resolution. The resolution is the result of Chapter VII of UN 
Charter, a measure for maintenance of international peace and security. For the purposes of 
maintaining  peace and security, situations which are not within the reach of ICC are referred 
to the ICC by the UNSC. This avoids setting up Ad-hoc Tribunal under Chapter VII for every 
peace treating situation.256 Sudan’s failure to co-operate according the UNSC resolution 
amounts as a threat to peace and security.257 
The referral of the UNSC gives a non-state party similar status to that of a state party since 
the referral brings the situation within the framework and principle of the Rome Statute. 
Moreover, Article 27 will be applied to Sudan preventing immunity to its head of state. In 
other words, if Sudan’s  head of state  is able to invoke immunity, subjecting  Al Bashir to the  
jurisdiction of the Court will be impossible, since States parties to the Rome Statute will be 
forced to respect immunity of non-state party which allows them to invoke Article 98 for 
failure to co-operate in the arrest and surrender. Consequently, this will make the UNSC 
referral ineffective as a sitting head of state will never be subjected to ICC jurisdiction. 
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It has been noted, that through the UNSC’s referral of the Darfur situation,  Sudan has the 
status of a state party to the Rome Statute. As a result, there is no the so called ‘conflicting 
obligation’ that arises for state parties to the Rome Statute while executing the arrest and 
surrender of Al Bashir. Al Bashir is not entitled to personal immunity as Article 27(2) totally 
strips such immunity of sitting head of states before domestic courts. Moreover, Article 98 
cannot be invoked by a state party for not effecting the arrest and surrender, because Al 
Bashir’s immunity has been renounced. Hence, Sudan is considered as a state party to the 
Rome Statute as a result of  the UNSC resolution 1593. In a similar manner, since Al Bashir is 
not entitled to immunity of customary international law there is no conflicting obligation for 
state parties rather just the obligation to cooperate and assist the arrest and surrender of Al 
Bashir. 
Even if, there is no competing obligation which refrains states parties from effecting their 
obligation, Al Bashir is still at large with no African states taking the initiative to arrest. Thus, 
despite their obligation to arrest and surrender Al Bashir, states parties of the Rome Statute 
were unable to effect the international arrest warrant issued against Al Bashir. South Africa is 
no exception to this. The following section discusses  Al Bashir’s case before South African 
domestic courts. 
      4.2.1.4 The Al Bashir Case before South African Courts  
The Sudanese president visited South Africa in June 2015 to attend the 25th African Union 
Summit in Johannesburg.258 After it was ascertained Al Bashir was going to visit South Africa, 
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the PTC of the ICC requested South Africa adhere to its obligation and arrest Al Bashir.259 
However, the government’s lack of action led the South African Litigation Centre (hereinafter 
SALC) suit against Minister of Justice and nine other state officials in the Gauteng High Court 
in Pretoria. SALC requested an interim order to prevent Al Bashir from leaving the country 
before a decision was given by the Court, despite the interim order Al Bashir left the country 
before the judgment was rendered by the court.260  
 The government argued that as a host of the AU General Assembly it was obliged to respect 
Al Bashir’s immunity while he was in South Africa attending the meeting and also relied on 
the Diplomatic Immunities and Privilege Act 37 (hereinafter DIPA) of 2001 which embodies   
hosting argument.261 However, the High Court rejected the above argument explaining the 
Articles of Hosting Agreement only apply to officials of AU delegates and representatives of 
international organisations and not to state representatives.262 The SALC asserted that the 
ICC Statute has clearly renounced immunity for incumbent head of states and similarly the 
provisions have been domesticated in the South African Implementation Act263 which 
precludes anyone from raising the defence of immunity for crimes under international law.264 
The Court also rejected the government’s claim of a competing obligation in the form of the 
AU decision not to co-operate, and the Court provided that South Africa’s obligation under 
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the Rome Statute which has been domesticated in the Implementation Act also renounces 
immunity. Thus, the provisions of the Implementation Act trumps the AU decision not to 
cooperate. 265 
Nonetheless, the government appealed to the Supreme Court relying on an entirely different 
argument than that was raised in the High Court. The government argued that Al Bashir as a 
sitting head of state of Sudan enjoyed immunity under customary international law and under 
DIPA section 4(1)(a)266.However, the SALC raised a counter argument claiming an exception 
exists under customary international law when crimes under international law have been 
committed and alleged that Al Bashir does not enjoy immunity. 
In addition, the SALC also argued Implementation Act to the Rome Statute has clearly 
provided there would be no immunity for foreign head of state indicted before the ICC for 
crimes under international law.267 The Supreme Court, while rendering judgment, explained 
that customary international law recognises head of state of immunity, and that there is no 
exception yet developed to assert otherwise.268 However, the removal of head of state 
immunity has clearly been specified under the Implementation Act section 10(9). Accordingly, 
the Court confirmed the decision of the High Court and dismissed the appeal asserting that 
South Africa as state party to Rome Statute had an obligation to arrest Al Bashir.269    
                                                          
265   SALC v Minister of Justice (2015) Para 33. 
266   SALC v Minister of Justice (2015) Para 49. Article 4(1)(a) of DIPA provides a head of state is immune from 
civil and criminal jurisdiction of South African Court and enjoys privilege accorded to according to 
customary international law. 
267   SALC v Minister of Justice (2015) Para 9. 
268   SALC v Minister of Justice (2015) Para 69- 84. 
269   SALC v Minister of Justice (2015) Para 113. 
 57 
 
   4.2.1.5 Does Duty Co-operation by the non-States Parties Invites Conflicting Obligations? 
The duty to co-operate with judicial orders of International Courts emanate from the 
constitutive instrument of the tribunal.270  When an obligation emanates from a treaty or 
agreement, failure to do so results in a breach of the contractual obligation. The same applies 
to a non-state party to the agreement; in the absence of consent no obligation to cooperate 
can arise.   
In principle, non-state parties to the Rome Statute are not obliged to cooperate with the ICC. 
Though, pursuant to Article 87(5)(a) of the Rome Statute, the Court can invite non-state 
parties to provide assistance on the basis of ad-hoc agreements with states. Thus, if a state 
who has entered into an agreement, fails to cooperate according to the agreement, the ICC 
may inform the Assembly of the Parties or the UNSC depending on the referral.271 Pursuant 
to the above provision, unless the non-state party is willing to provide assistance by entering 
into an ad-hoc agreement there is no mandatory obligation for non-states parties. 
Nevertheless, the obligation for non-state parties to co-operate with the Court where the 
situation has been referred by the UNSC, the co-operation should proceed under 
international law and not the Rome Statute. Coming to the case at hand, the Darfur situation 
was referred by the UNSC as a measure to restore international peace and security. Hence, 
non-states parties’ obligation to co-operate with the request of the ICC emanates from the 
UN Charter and not from the Rome Statute. As a member of the of the UN, non-members 
states to the ICC Statute have an obligation to obey the decision of SC pursuant to Article 25 
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of the UN charter.272 UNSC resolution 1593 acknowledges that non-member states to the 
Rome Statute do not have mandatory obligation to cooperate with the ICC under the Rome 
Statute.  Nonetheless, the UNSC ‘urges all states and concerned regional and other 
international organisation to co-operate fully’.273  
Some scholars argue that according to the use of hortatory language ‘urges’, the resolution 
does not create an obligation to co-operate as the word does not generate a mandatory 
obligation, but rather gives a recommendation  or encouragement to take measures.274 That 
being said, the use of hortatory language by the resolution should not be construed as there 
is no  obligation. In South West Africa Advisory Opinion, the ICJ contended that before 
conclusion is drawn on the UNSC resolution whether it is mandatory or hortatory obligation, 
the resolution should be analysed in light of Article 25 of UN Charter.275 In addition, the Court 
also asserted that when the UNSC adopts a decision under Article 25 of the Charter, all the 
UN members states must act accordingly, even those who voted against the decision.276  
Pertaining to the above argument, all UN member states, even those who are not states 
parties to Rome Statute, have an obligation to deliver on the arrest and surrender of Al Bashir. 
However, non-states parties’ relation with state in question, which is Sudan, is governed by 
the principle of customary international law. Under customary international law, sitting head 
of state enjoys immunity, a principle that states have to respect. Thus, on the one hand non-
states parties to the Rome Statute have an obligation  to arrest and handover Al Bashir as a 
result of the UNSC resolution and UN Charter and on the other hand, non-states parties also 
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have an obligation to respect the immunity of another non-state party according to the 
principle of customary international law.  Clearly, a conflicting obligation arises for non-states 
parties to the Statute. Thus, as a result of the apparent conflicting obligation  which obligation 
of non- state parties shall prevail? Consequently, Article 103 of UN Charter comes into play. 
Article 103 provides that: 
‘In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations 
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.’ 
There are two sides of the argument pertaining to Article 103. Some assert there is a 
conflicting obligation for non-state parties and suggest the application of Article 103 of UN 
Charter, which gives primacy to the obligation that arises from the UNSC resolution.277 In 
contrast, others argue that Article 103 does not apply to this situation as it does not apply in 
the case of conflicting obligations emanating from UN resolutions and customary 
international law. In fact, scholars substantiate the argument by relaying on the wording of 
Article 103 which provides it is only  an obligation that arises from an international agreement 
conflicts with an obligation of the resolution under the UN Charter that an obligation 
emanating from the Charter shall prevail.278 In view of that, the argument asserts 
international agreements encompass treaties or conventional laws and not customary 
international law.279 Nonetheless, the UN Charter is a constitutional document, thus any 
obligation that emanates from the charter has to get precedence from any other obligation 
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including duties emanating from customary international law.280 Similarly, in the South West 
African cases, Judge Jessup asserted that Article 103 of UN Charter should not be interpreted 
to exclude any treaty, convention or other international engagement or undertaking.281 
Based on the above assertion, Article 103 of Charter can be applicable to non-states parties 
and their obligation under the resolution prevails over the obligation to respect the immunity 
of sitting head of state under customary international law. 
Thus, non-states parties have an obligation to live up to the request of the resolution not 
because of the Rome Statute, but as result of UN Charter and as being a member of UN 
Charter, states have to cooperate with the decision of the UNSC as it attributes to maintaining 
peace and security of the international community.   
 
4.3 Emerging exception to Personal Immunity under International Law? 
Under the principle of international law, states can alter their rights under customary 
international law by entering into agreement to the contrary. In other words, states are 
entitled to modify the existing custom by entering into a multilateral treaty. However is this 
enough to establish customary international law? Customary international law is a result of 
state practice and opinio juris. 
In the PTC Decision of the Republic of Malawi’s failure to comply with the co-operation 
request of the ICC to arrest and surrender Al Bashir, the Chamber held that customary 
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international law creates an exception to the head of state immunity before international 
courts.282 The Chamber stated immunity of head of state has been rejected since the First 
World War and also asserted there is an increase of international prosecutions of head of 
states by international courts.283 It affirms that the prosecution of a head of state by 
international courts is an accepted practice.284 The Chamber supports its argument by 
pointing out that the ICC Statute has been ratified by 120 states, which in effect means that 
these states parties accepts the abolishment of immunity under international law for crimes 
under international law.285 
However, the reasoning of the Chamber has been contested, since the rational that the 
prosecution of sitting head of states is accepted practice is a far-fetched argument, because 
only Muammer Gadaffi and Al Bashir have been indicted by the ICC while in capacity of sitting 
head of state. 286 However, Gadaffi died and did not appear  before the Court. Al Bashir 
remains the sole incumbent head of state to be indicted before the Court.287 Although Charles 
Taylor and Milosevic were indicted while they were sitting heads of state before SCSL and 
ICTY respectively. The Chamber also points out the number of states parties who have ratified 
the Rome Statute and renounced the immunity of sitting heads of states for crimes under 
international law. However, this can only address the issue of personal immunity before 
International Courts and not before domestic jurisdictions. In addition, it is not enough to 
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evidence for the establishment of an exception for customary international law before foreign 
domestic courts.288  
The principle that individual official capacity does not protect the individual from criminal 
responsibility, does not mean it removes the immunity that the official may enjoy.289 The 
violation of human rights is the reason for the shift from state responsibility to subjecting 
individuals to international law. However, Van Alebeek argues the development of 
international human rights does not affect international law immunity principles, while she 
also emphasises that there is no clear state of law argument in favor of the exception 
developed for personal immunity.290 Cryer et al also assert that functional immunity has been 
redefined with regard to crimes under international law; however, state practice and 
jurisprudence have upheld personal immunity in domestic jurisprudence despite the nature 
of the crime.291 As a result, without state practice and opinio juris it is hard to conclude that 
non-immunity has emerged as an exception to the rule of immunity under customary 
international practice before domestic jurisdiction.292 The only situation where immunity has 
become irrelevant is according to the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case, when the state official is 
indicted before international court such as ICC.  
4.4 Malabo Protocol and ICC 
The clear contradiction of Article 46abis compared with the provisions contained in the Rome 
Statute has drawn considerable criticism as immunity provided in the Protocol retrogrades 
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the fight against immunity. The immunity provision has also received criticism for being 
unclear to which officials it applies. The inclusion of the number of crimes which most likely 
are to be committed by sitting heads of state, for instance aggression, unconstitutional 
change of government, which at the same time providing them a shield from prosecution 
seems inconsistent.293 Article 46abis is not only inconsistent with the Rome Statute, but it is 
also at odds with the AU’s Constitutive Act.294 The AU Constitutive Act Article 4(h) provides a 
mandate for the AU to intervene pursuant to the decision of the Assembly for crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.295 Subsequently, the AU’s report on universal jurisdiction has 
indicated that Article 4(h) provides the AU’s member states to practice universal jurisdiction 
for crimes under international law.296 
This is a recognition of the AU that certain crimes are serious to Africa and to the international 
community, so those responsible for the acts should not go unpunished.297  With regard to 
the Rome Statute, Article 46abis also creates confusion and further contradiction for the few 
states that domesticated the Rome Statute.298 Incongruously, the inclusion of immunity by 
the Protocol may actually assert the importance of the ICC, by making it impossible to 
prosecute the African leaders for serious human rights violations in the African Court, AU, 
strengthen the need for ICC. 299It is more likely the argument that accountability is not 
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removed, but rather delayed and African leaders can be brought to justice  when they are no 
longer in office. However, it cannot be ignored when such a provision produces inducement 
for the official in power and subsequently avoids criminal responsibility and the victims have 
to wait a long  time to acquire justice, as ‘justice delayed is justice denied’.300 
Unfortunately, at the time of writing, Burundi and South Africa have decided to withdraw 
from the Rome Statute. This decision can likely bring a chain reaction from other African 
states. In particular, Burundi’s decision to leave seems to be a reaction to the commenced 
investigation by ICC prosecutors. Be that as it may, before Burundi’s withdrawal is recognised, 
there will be a one year grace period in which the Court will still have jurisdiction over Burundi. 
On this basis, one can argue that the ICC will still have jurisdiction, since it is when domestic 
courts are unable and unwilling to prosecute, that the ICC becomes effective. However, the 
Protocol’s impact on states co-operation cannot be overlooked.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusion  
Immunity is an international law principle which protects high ranking government officials 
from judicial action. International immunity can be categorised into functional immunity and 
personal immunity. Functional immunity protects all governmental officials from being held 
accountable for the decisions they undertake while they are state representatives. The 
principle of personal immunity safeguards the head of state, head of government and foreign 
ministers from any judicial action while still in office. Functional immunity is a substantive 
impediment while personal immunity procedural impairment. 
Importantly, the concept of personal immunity through time has achieved customary 
international law status. However, the development of international criminal law which led 
to holding individuals responsible for crimes under international law, has brought some 
progress to international criminal law The need to fight impunity for heinous atrocities of the 
world has initiated the irrelevance of personal immunity. Accordingly, jurisprudence of 
international tribunals has rejected the principle of personal immunity of incumbent head of 
states from being used as a safeguard from criminal prosecution. Following this precedent, 
the Rome Statute also provided a clear stipulation that personal immunity of state officials 
cannot be a bar to prosecution. States parties of the Statute have willingly accepted the 
removal of immunity for their officials, and as a result, have to act accordingly when the ICC 
indicts their officials.  
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 The UNSC’s referral could trigger the jurisdiction of the ICC which may lead to the indictment 
of non-states parties head of states before the court as illustrated by the case against Al 
Bashir. As the ICC has no police force the Court is dependent on the co-operation of states  to 
prosecute indicted individuals and to bring them to justice. However, securing the co-
operation of member states and non-members has been difficult for ICC, if not impossible. 
The controversy in relation to personal immunity of head of states before international 
tribunals and before domestic courts is still hotly contested matter. As discussed in the third 
chapter, personal immunity has been abolished before international tribunals and the 
precedent of the international tribunals and the decision of ICJ in the Arrest Warrant Case has 
provided much needed clarity on the matter. Nonetheless, the status of personal immunity is 
still persisting before foreign domestic courts.  
The indictment of Al Bashir has been contested as Sudan is not a member state of the Rome 
Statute, however, pertaining to the UNSC referral, the Darfur situation has been referred to 
the Court which led to the arrest warrant against Al Bashir. According to Article 39, the UNSC 
is mandated to take measures which encompass military or otherwise to maintain the peace 
and security of the world. Such measures of the UNSC bring non states parties like Sudan 
before the jurisdiction of the Court. The focus of the research was to explore if states parties 
face conflicting obligations if they decided to arrest and surrender Al Bashir. Although the 
concept of personal immunity is void before international tribunals, it is still confirmed to 
exist before foreign domestic courts. In order to bring Al Bashir before the jurisdiction of ICC, 
states parties have to arrest him and order him before their domestic courts.  
According to the UNSC referral, the jurisdiction of ICC can be extended to non-state parties 
to the Rome Statute. As a result of this non-state party’s immunity will also be affected. 
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However, some scholars raise the Vienna Convention and argue that a treaty based court 
cannot create an obligation on a non-state party without its consent. Sudan is not member 
state of the Rome Statute, nonetheless, it is a member of the UN Charter. The UNSC 
employing its mandate to maintain peace and security has referred the Darfur situation to 
the ICC. As a result, the resolution has laid an obligation on Sudan to fully cooperate and assist 
the jurisdiction of the court. The UNSC referral gives non-state parties a similar status to that 
of state party. Thus, if Sudan acquires the same status as that of a state party, Al Bashir no 
longer enjoys immunity and as a result Article 98 of Rome Statute cannot be claimed since 
personal immunity has already been renounced. Consequently, a state party to the Rome 
Statute cannot invoke the so called conflicting obligation for failure to co-operate with arrest 
and surrender of Al Bashir, since Al Bashir’s immunity has already been renounced. 
As a principle, non-states parties to the Rome Statute are not obliged to cooperate with the 
ICC as they are not states parties to begin with. However, Al Bashir’s indictment is a result of 
a UNSC referral to restore international peace. Accordingly, the obligation to cooperate is a 
result of the UN Charter and not of the Rome Statute. On the one hand, pursuant to Article 
25 of UN Charter, all member states have an obligation to obey the decision of the UNSC 
which includes non-states parties to the Rome Statute. On the other hand, a non-state party 
to the Rome Statute also has an obligation to respect the immunity of head of states before 
their domestic jurisdiction. In this case, states are in between competing obligations. In such 
cases Article 103 of UN Charter provides that the Charter obligations prevail over other 
international obligations which include customary law according to the South West Africa 
Case before the ICJ. 
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In Conclusion, both states parties and non-state parties to the Rome Statute have an 
obligation to assist the ICC in the arrest and surrender of Al Bashir. Despite this, African states 
have refused to co-operate with the ICC, and has alleged that they have been targeted by the 
ICC. In addition, if the Malabo Protocol is ratified and enforced, African leaders will be 
protected by personal immunity which goes against the development of international 
criminal law and the pursuit against impunity.  
5.2 Recommendations  
The absence of enforcement mechanisms in the international tribunals and the lack of co-
operation of states has led to a delay in the international judicial process. Particularly, the 
controversy in relation to the status personal immunity before international tribunals and 
domestic courts has to be clarified. Besides the impact of the UNSC referral in the personal 
immunity of head of states of non-state parties to the Rome Statute is one of the major issues 
that need to be explained and asserted by the International Law Commission in order to 
acquire co-operation of states in the indictment of high-level government officials. 
The current stand-off between  a number of African states and the ICC seems to trigger a 
chain of action where African states are threatening and even few are in the process of the 
withdrawing their membership from the ICC. Thus, in order to maintain functionality of the 
ICC there needs to be a constructive discussion between African states and the ICC. This 
perhaps will contribute to tackle negative perceptions against the ICC. The ICC has to reassure 
African states by investigating and prosecuting atrocities beyond the African continent. 
It is goes without saying that the criticism of bias against the African continent is mostly raised 
by threatened political leaders. Therefore, African states have to stop campaigning against 
the ICC. After all, the ICC can only acquire jurisdiction based on the principle of 
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complementarity. Thus, it is only when the domestic courts are unwilling and incapable of 
bringing to justice those accountable for crimes that  the ICC takes charge of a case. If African 
states are committed to respecting human rights and ending the culture of impunity, then the 
ICC will have a very limited significance over the continent. 
Besides, if African states are serious about providing an African solution to an African 
problem, the undertaken efforts should be appreciated and encouraged. However, 
establishing a regional court particularly to try fourteen crimes is going to need huge amount 
of resources. If the Malabo Protocol has to be enforced the relation between ICC and the 
African Court has to be clearly addressed. The relation should once again be based on the 
principle of complementarity. In addition, the issue of finance and political independence has 
to be managed as well. Most importantly, the immunity provision has to be omitted from the 
Protocol if it is going to have any success of maintaining justice in the African continent.  
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